This volume constitutes the papers of the 3rd International Workshop on Active Inference, IWAI 2022, held in Grenoble, France, in conjunction with ECML/PKDD, on September 19, 2022. The 25 revised full papers presented in this book were carefully reviewed and selected from 31 submissions.
The first comprehensive treatment of active inference, an integrative perspective on brain, cognition, and behavior used across multiple disciplines. Active inference is a way of understanding sentient behavior—a theory that characterizes perception, planning, and action in terms of probabilistic inference. Developed by theoretical neuroscientist Karl Friston over years of groundbreaking research, active inference provides an integrated perspective on brain, cognition, and behavior that is increasingly used across multiple disciplines including neuroscience, psychology, and philosophy. Active inference puts the action into perception. This book offers the first comprehensive treatment of active inference, covering theory, applications, and cognitive domains. Active inference is a “first principles” approach to understanding behavior and the brain, framed in terms of a single imperative to minimize free energy. The book emphasizes the implications of the free energy principle for understanding how the brain works. It first introduces active inference both conceptually and formally, contextualizing it within current theories of cognition. It then provides specific examples of computational models that use active inference to explain such cognitive phenomena as perception, attention, memory, and planning.
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the First International Workshop on Active Inference, IWAI 2020, co-located with ECML/PKDD 2020, held in Ghent, Belgium, in September 2020. The 13 full papers along with 6 short papers were thoroughly reviewed and selected from 25 submissions. They are organized in the topical sections on active inference and continuous control; active inference and machine learning; active inference: theory and biology.
The first comprehensive treatment of active inference, an integrative perspective on brain, cognition, and behavior used across multiple disciplines. Active inference is a way of understanding sentient behavior—a theory that characterizes perception, planning, and action in terms of probabilistic inference. Developed by theoretical neuroscientist Karl Friston over years of groundbreaking research, active inference provides an integrated perspective on brain, cognition, and behavior that is increasingly used across multiple disciplines including neuroscience, psychology, and philosophy. Active inference puts the action into perception. This book offers the first comprehensive treatment of active inference, covering theory, applications, and cognitive domains. Active inference is a “first principles” approach to understanding behavior and the brain, framed in terms of a single imperative to minimize free energy. The book emphasizes the implications of the free energy principle for understanding how the brain works. It first introduces active inference both conceptually and formally, contextualizing it within current theories of cognition. It then provides specific examples of computational models that use active inference to explain such cognitive phenomena as perception, attention, memory, and planning.
"Perception and cognition are tightly related. As our primary mode of contact with the world, perception is the informational and causal foundation of our cognitive processes; it is fundamental to our empirical thinking, believing, and action planning. Traditional accounts of the mind consider perception and cognition to be distinct, yet highly interrelated, systems. Much interdisciplinary empirical and theoretical work, from cognitive scientists and philosophers, has attempted to elucidate the complex relations holding among these systems, suggesting the existence not only of influences of perception on cognition but also vice versa. However, many questions are left unanswered. Given that perception is a guide to our thinking about and acting upon the world appropriately, the two systems must be able to 'talk' to one another; information carried by perception must be of a form adequate to be 'taken in' by our various cognitive systems. The question arises: What kinds of structural similarities must hold between perceptual and cognitive representations for such 'communication' to be possible? And how exactly do perceptual and cognitive representations interact? Some researchers have argued that the links between perception and cognition are so tight as to instill doubt as to the significance of the distinction between the two systems in the first place. Yet others insist that perception and cognition remain distinct. The aim of this Research Topic is to deepen our understanding of the kinds of interaction among perception and cognition and of the nature of the representational structures that would enable such interaction." -- Provided by publisher.
This monograph presents a clear account of when and how attentional processes can shape perceptual experience. This argument is based on the prediction-error minimization model of the mind. The author believes that the topic of attention should take a more central role in the debate about the influence of cognition on perception. Inside, he shows how this can be possible. The hypothesis that cognition may shape perceptual experience has been traditionally labeled as the cognitive penetrability of perceptual experience. Cognitive penetrability is relevant for several debates in philosophy and cognitive science. It tackles the possibility of gathering genuine knowledge on the basis of perceptual information about the world delivered by sensory channels. The problem, the author notes, is that if our previously acquired belief can shape current perceptual experiences, such experiences cannot serve as an adequate source of justification in retaining those beliefs or even forming new ones. He argues that cognitive penetration may sometimes happen through attentional processes, but that its occurrence need not undermine perceptual justification. The book provides an overview of the cognitive penetrability debate. The author discusses evidence that supports the occurrence of this phenomenon. Overall, this investigation offers readers a philosophical discussion of attention based on the biased-competition theory. It argues that attention is a property of mental representations that emerges from a metacognitive competition process.
Neuroscience of Enduring Change is founded on the premise that all major psychotherapy modalities producing enduring change do so by virtue of corrective emotional experiences that alter problematic memories through the process of reconsolidation. This book is unique in linking basic science concepts to clinical research and clinical application. Experts in each area address each of the basic science and clinical topics. No other book addresses a general mechanism of change in psychotherapy in combination with the basic science underpinning it. This book is also unique in bringing the latest neuroimaging evidence and cutting-edge conceptual approaches to bear in understanding how psychological and behavioral treatment approaches bring about lasting change in the brain. Clinicians will benefit from the detailed discussion of basic mechanisms that underpin their clinical interventions and will be challenged to consider how their approach to therapy might be adjusted to optimize the opportunities for enduring change. Researchers will benefit from authoritative reviews of extant knowledge and a clear description of the research agenda going forward. The cross-fertilization between the research and clinical domains is evident throughout.
Andy Clark is a leading philosopher of cognitive science, whose work has had an extraordinary impact throughout philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, and robotics. His monographs have led the way for new research programs in the philosophy of mind and cognition: Microcognition (1989) and Associative Engines (1993) introduced the philosophical community to connectionist research and the novel issues it raised; Being There (1997) showed the relevance of embodiment, dynamical systems theory, and minimal computation frameworks for the study of the mind; Natural Born Cyborgs (OUP 2003) presented an accessible development of embodied and embedded approaches to understanding human nature and cognition; Supersizing the Mind (OUP 2008) developed this yet further along with the famous "Extended Mind" hypothesis; and Surfing Uncertainty (OUP 2017) presents a framework for uniting perception, action, and the embodied mind. In Andy Clark and His Critics, a range of high-profile researchers in philosophy of mind, philosophy of cognitive science, and empirical cognitive science, critically engage with Clark's work across the themes of: Extended, Embodied, Embedded, Enactive, and Affective Minds; Natural Born Cyborgs; and Perception, Action, and Prediction. Daniel Dennett provides a foreword on the significance of Clark's work, and Clark replies to each section of the book, thus advancing current literature with original contributions that will form the basis for new discussions, debates and directions in the discipline.
Predictive coding (PC) is a neurocognitive concept, according to which the brain does not process the whole qualia of external information, but only residual mismatches occurring between incoming information and an individual, inner model of the world. At the time of issue initiation, I expected an essential focus on mismatch signals in the brain, especially those captured by neurophysiologic oscillations. This was because one most plausible approach to the PC concept is to identify and validate mismatch signals in the brain. Announcing the topic revealed a much deeper consideration of intelligible minds of researchers. It turned out that what was of fundamental interest was which brain mechanisms support the formation, maintenance and consolidation of the inner model determining PC. Is PC a dynamic construct continuously modulated by external environmental or internal mental information? The reader will be delighted to get acquainted with the current views and understanding of eminent scholars in the field. It will be challenging to discover the realm of sleep where both physiological, energy preserving and mental qualia principles build on the inner models to shape and transform the self. And where neurophysiologic oscillations may both transmit external information and translate inner models from state to state to preserve the self-continuity and compactness.
Enactivist Interventions is an interdisciplinary work that explores how theories of embodied cognition illuminate many aspects of the mind, including intentionality, representation, the affect, perception, action and free will, higher-order cognition, and intersubjectivity. Gallagher argues for a rethinking of the concept of mind, drawing on pragmatism, phenomenology and cognitive science. Enactivism is presented as a philosophy of nature that has significant methodological and theoretical implications for the scientific investigation of the mind. Gallagher argues that, like the basic phenomena of perception and action, sophisticated cognitive phenomena like reflection, imagining, and mathematical reasoning are best explained in terms of an affordance-based skilled coping. He offers an account of the continuity that runs between basic action, affectivity, and a rationality that in every case remains embodied. Gallagher's analysis also addresses recent predictive models of brain function and outlines an alternative, enactivist interpretation that emphasizes the close coupling of brain, body and environment rather than a strong boundary that isolates the brain in its internal processes. The extensive relational dynamics that integrates the brain with the extra-neural body opens into an environment that is physical, social and cultural and that recycles back into the enactive process. Cognitive processes are in-the-world rather than in-the-head; they are situated in affordance spaces defined across evolutionary, developmental and individual histories, and are constrained by affective processes and normative dimensions of social and cultural practices.
Relative to the extensive neuroscientific work on seated meditation practices, far less studies have investigated the neural mechanisms underlying movement-based contemplative practices such as yoga or tai chi. Movement-based practices have, however, been found to be effective for relieving the symptoms of several clinical conditions, and to elicit measurable changes in physiological, neural, and behavioral parameters in healthy individuals. An important challenge for neuroscience is therefore to advance our understanding of the neurophysiological and neurocognitive mechanisms underlying these observed effects, and this Research Topic aims to make a contribution in this regard. It showcases the current state of the art of investigations on movement-based practices including yoga, tai chi, the Feldenkrais Method, as well as dance. Featured contributions include empirical research, proposals of theoretical frameworks, as well as novel perspectives on a variety of issues relevant to the field. This Research Topic is the first of its kind to specifically attempt a neurophysiological and neurocognitive characterization that spans multiple mindful movement approaches, and we trust it will be of interest to basic scientists, clinical researchers, and contemplative practitioners alike.
